Underperforming Schools
Statement of Jim Peyser, Chair, MA Board of Education
Board of Education Meeting

November 29, 2005

Since we began evaluating schools for underperformance in 2000, we have largely relied on turnaround strategies derived from an inclusive process of analysis and planning conducted by the school's existing staff, in collaboration with the local district and the department. This process has typically resulted in incremental improvement initiatives, sometimes accompanied by leadership changes. Most of the improvement plans brought to the board have focused on increasing the collection and use of student performance data, strengthening professional development programs, and implementing curriculum changes.

Although most of these steps are usually consistent with accepted research on effective schools, and even though everyone participating in these efforts has worked hard and acted in good faith, after five years we can now say that this approach to fixing failing schools has itself failed to produce meaningful, measurable results. On average, the 40 schools that have received "panel reviews" and have operated under improvement plans for at least two full years have seen combined MCAS gains in English and math slightly below the state as a whole - a mere four percentage point increase in the rate of proficiency since 2002. Of these schools, 10 actually saw declines in their aggregate proficiency rates during this period. Another 10 posted gains that averaged less than 2 percentage points per year. Only 10 of these schools achieved overall annual proficiency rate increases of 3 points or more.

It is my belief that one of the principal reasons these improvement plans have failed to create more dramatic change is that they do not address the underlying causes of underperformance. The educational problems we face in low-performing schools are fundamentally structural and systemic - not programmatic. Instructional practices in these schools may be weak and inconsistent, but they cannot be fixed by putting in place a new curriculum or a professional development program. Neither can they be fixed by simply replacing the staff or increasing resources. All of these things may be sorely needed, but without radically changing the context, they will prove unavailing.

There is little debate or disagreement about WHAT high-performing schools look like. What is not well understood is HOW to create organizations that can actually execute effectively and consistently over time. I believe that effective execution is dependent on at least four things:

empowered leadership, with responsibility for managing both money and people;
incentives & accountability for everyone, tied to student performance;
clarity of educational beliefs and practices that all staff and families understand and embrace; and
organizational & operational coherence that reinforces the school's core educational strategy.
Current policy and practice makes this extremely difficult to do, because of:

political interference in schools;
a command and control ethos in district offices; and
district-wide collective bargaining agreements.
Rightly conceived, our state accountability process should directly address these crippling barriers. Unfortunately, none of the improvement plans we have seen or approved has even identified these obstacles as a problem, let alone offered a strategy for overcoming them. While the limitations of our accountability statute make it difficult to tackle some of these issues head on, I am afraid that we are not even trying to use the authority we have. Moreover, the incrementalism of our school turnaround efforts reflects a lack of imagination, a lack of will, and most troubling, a lack of urgency.

Under the existing law and regulations, the board has broad authority to make such changes as it sees fit to the remedial plans submitted on behalf of underperforming schools. Here's an idea for what we might do to break the established pattern:

In collaboration with the department, school districts would issue RFPs for the autonomous management of all schools declared underperforming.

Proposals may be submitted by the school's faculty or other educators in the district, colleges and universities, non-profit organizations, charter school operators, or independent school management firms.

Based on the quality of the turnaround plans and the capacity of the leadership teams, the district and department would recommend the best proposal to the board of education for its approval.

The district would then enter into a multi-year performance contract with the new school management group, based on guidelines established by the board.

If a district is unwilling or unable to enter into such a contract, the board would seek the approval of special legislation to convert the school into an independent Commonwealth charter school.
In my view the plans before us today offer hope for modest improvement, at best. At worst, they merely endorse pre-existing reforms and protect the status quo relationships of adults. While each plan has its own unique set of weaknesses, they all reflect an underlying belief that the schools in question are not in crisis and no extraordinary measures are needed. This belief is simply false and will only serve to perpetuate underperformance, while condemning another generation of young people to lives of limited opportunity.

While I will listen closely to the conversation this morning, it is my intention to vote against these plans.